MINORITY PARTY ACCESS TO THE BALLOT
Relatively little attention has been devoted to the question of
minority party access to the ballot through the petition process,
primarily because of the predominant two-party system which
prevails in the United States. Not since the Republican emergence in
the late 1850's has any third party actually been successful in
permanently realigning existing political loyalties, and only in those
relatively rare instances when a third party has presented a serious
presidential candidate have the laws dealing with access to the ballot
been given much consideration.' Thus, it is not surprising that the
presidential campaign of George Wallace and his American
2
Independent Party in 1968 generated a flurry of judicial activity.
With both liberal and conservative political factions currently
expressing a willingness to contest the reign of the established parties
in 1972, litigation involving access to the ballot will likely increase
rather than diminish in the future. Until recently the judiciary has
been reluctant to consider the problems in this area, adhering to the
principle that the issue was a political question 3 and therefore
nonjusticiable. 4 This view was based on the fear that if the courts were
to become involved in political matters, relief, if given, might do more
6
harm than good.5 Although some remnants of the doctrine remain,
I. See generally Note, Legal Obstacles to Minority Party Success, 57 YALE L.J. 1276
(1948).
2. The Wallace campaign was directly responsible for the landmark case of Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See notes 35-48 infra and accompanying text.
3. The political question doctrine was most succinctly described by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
[Tihere is not under our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political mischief, for
every undesirable exercise of legislative power. The Framers carefully and with deliberate
forethought refused so to enthrone the judiciary. In . . . [such situations] relief must
come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's
representatives. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
4. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
5. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 286 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring), over'd Moore
v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969). In MacDougall the Supreme Court was called upon to
determine the constitutionality of an Illinois statute requiring that at least 200 of the 25,000
signatures needed for a nominating petition had to come from each of 50 different counties. The
Court held that the requirement did not violate the due process, equal protection, or privileges
and immunities clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The only really surprising aspect of the
case was that the Court was willing to reach any decision at all on the merits. By the time the
decision was handed down, only 12 days remained until the national election of 1948, a factor
clearly increasing the reluctance of the Court to grant affirmative relief. The requirement of
25,000 signatures remains in effect. See note 86 infra and accompanying text.
6. The political question doctrine has been a vital aid to the federal courts in escaping the
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its strength has waned considerably since the landmark case of Baker
v. Carr,7 in which the Supreme Court held legislative
malapportionment to present a justiciable issue. Were the political
question doctrine still dominant, cases dealing with access to the
ballot through the petition process could not receive a thorough
hearing on the merits. Having once breached the political thicket,
however, it was probably inevitable that the federal judiciary would
soon find itself confronted with a controversy concerning minority
party access to the ballot. The first serious effort to overcome
inequities in state petition requirements was undertaken in Williams v.
Rhodes,' but two more recent decisions, Socialist Workers Party
(S WP) v. Rockefeller9 and Georgia Socialist Workers Party (GS WP)
v. Fortson,0 have elaborated extensively upon the principal issues.
This note will examine the latter cases in detail.
SWP v. Rockefeller involved an attack on various sections of the
New York State Election Law." The Socialist Workers Party sought
to have placed on the 1970 general election ballot a slate of candidates
for election to various state-wide and local offices. Under New York
law, however, the organization could not even be termed a political
party, in that it had failed to poll at least 50,000 votes in the preceding
gubernatorial election. 2 Instead, the SWP was forced to settle for
designation as an "independent body,"' 3 a characterization requiring
it to utilize petitions to obtain a place on a New York ballot.' 4 When
forced to proceed by this route, the Socialist Workers Party,
encountering difficulties in satisfying the statutory requirements,
brought an action to have the requirements stricken and presented
three primary arguments in favor of its position.
First, it contended that the Election Law discriminated against
and placed unreasonable burdens upon independent or minority
unpleasant task of dealing with issues revolving around the Vietnamese war. E.g., Eminente v.
Johnson, 361 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 929 (1966). The possible presence
of a political question is often acknowledged even when the doctrine itself is not followed. See
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
7. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
8. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
9. 314 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y.), affdmem.,400 U.S. 806 (1970).
10. 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970), appeal docketed sub noma.
Jenness v. Fortson, 39
U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1970), argued 39 U.S.L.W. 3386 (U.S. Mar. I, 1971) (No. 5714).
11. N.Y. ELECTION LAW §§ 1-422 (McKinney 1964).
12. Id. § 2(4).
13. Id. § 2(11).
14. Id. § 138(l).
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parties, thus impeding their participation in the electoral process.' 5
Second, the requirements were portrayed as interfering with the right

to associate freely for the advancement of political beliefs.16 Third, it
was maintained that enforcement would impair the right of all

registered voters to have an equal opportunity to cast their ballots for
the candidates of their choice.' 7 The three-judge district court struck
down or qualified nearly all the provisions challenged by the SWP,18
including a vital section of the Election Law which required that all

nominating petitions be signed by at least 50 voters in each county of
19
the state of New York.
GS WP v. Fortson20 deals with the number of voter signatures

needed for a valid nominating petition. Under Georgia law the
requirement is set at "not less than five percent of the total number of

electors eligible to vote in the last election for the filling of the office
the candiate is seeking ....

",21

Due to its poor record in previous

15. Severe drains on financial and manpower resources were the burdens to which the SWP
referred. 314 F. Supp. at 989.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 997. Injunctive relief against enforcement of state statutes was asked, thus
requiring a three-judge district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
The only challenged provision that was not at least questioned was section 168 of the
Election Law, which establishes minimum literacy requirements for New York voters. N.Y.
ELEcTION LAW § 168 (McKinney 1964). The court found no conflict between that section and
Supreme Court holdings involving the literacy issue, the most important of which is Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
The court considered and declared invalid another provision of the Election Law which
allowed lists of registered voters to be delivered free of charge to any county party chairman.
N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 376(5) (McKinney 1964). This provision was found to constitute a
denial of equal protection. The problem, of course, was that the phrase "county party
chairman" could refer only to the chairman of a political organization whose candidate had
received over 50,000 votes in the preceding gubernatorial election. See note 12 supra and
accompanying text. Because of the unique nature of the section and its relatively tenuous
relationship to the petition process, it will not be discussed further in this note.
19. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 138(5)(a) (McKinney 1964). One intriguing provision of this
section permits "the counties of Fulton and Hamilton to be considered as one county." Such are
the ways of politics.
20. 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
21. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1010(b) (Supp. 1969). The Georgia statute refers to eligible
voters in general, rather than to the number who actually voted in the preceding election. A
statute such as that in Illinois, which requires independent candidates for political office within
any district or subdivision of the state to file petitions containing signatures equaling not less
than five percent of the number of persons who voted in the last election, 46 ILL. REV. STAT. 10-3
(Supp. 1971), would appear to represent a lighter burden on minority parties. The Illinois
requirement was recently upheld in Jackson v. Ogilvie, F. Supp. (N.D. Ill. 1971).
Independent candidates for statewise office in Illinois, however, must file petitions containing
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elections, the GSWP found itself confronted with the necessity of

meeting this requirement in order to obtain a place on the ballot.2" It
brought an action alleging that the provision represented a violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and was
an unconstitutional burden on their freedoms "of speech, petition,

and association, as well as on their 'right to vote.'

"21

As a subsidiary

claim, the GSWP also attacked the state's requirement of a qualifying

fee, amounting to five percent of the annual salary of the office for

24
which a candidate is running.
In Fortson the five percent signature requirement was upheld on

the ground that it did not constitute invidious, intentional, or
purposeful discrimination.2 Unlike the court in SWP v. Rockefeller,

the Fortson court was apparently reluctant to attack statutory
provisions relating to the petition process. However, the GSWP's
candidates were relieved of the obligation to pay a qualifying fee, on
the ground that the joint effect of petition and fee requirements
represents an unreasonable burden on minority parties.2"

If access to the ballot is to be considered an integral part of the
voting process, an approach that clearly was adopted in SWP v.

Rockefeller,2 the equal protection analysis that has been applied in a
series of cases dealing with electoral matters becomes relevant. The
0 Wesberry v.
cases include Baker v. Carr,2 8 Gray v. Sanders,"
the names of 25,000 qualified voters. 46 ILL. REV. STAT. § 10-3 (Supp. 197 1). See note 86 infra
and accompanying text.
22. Any political organization in Georgia which receives less than 20 percent of the vote in
the preceding gubernatorial or presidential election is classed as a "political body" rather than a
"political party." GA. CODE ANN. § 34-103(s)-(u) (1970). In order for a political body to
nominate a candidate for public office, it must file nominating petitions meeting the five percent
requirement. Id. § 34-1001. The GSWP apparently did not make any affirmative effort to
satisfy these requirements prior to bringing suit; however, the court evidently did not view this as
a standing criterion.
23. 315 F. Supp. at 1037.
24. Id. at 1040-41; GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1013 (1970).
25. 315 F. Supp. at 1040.
26. See note 67 infra and accompanying text.
27. 314 F. Supp. at 989.
28. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Court held that those persons who are adversely affected by
legislative malapportionment have a justiciable cause of action.
29. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). Georgia's county-unit elective system, which permitted the
residents of counties having a small population to exert substantially more influence at the polls
than residents of more heavily populated counties, was held to be in violation of the equal
protection clause.
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Sanders,0 and Reynolds v. Sims. 3 1 In these cases the Supreme Court
developed and emphasized certain fundamental principles that have
had an effect on all questions touching upon the right to vote. Central
among these principles is the following:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must
live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined.32

Since the right to vote is so vital, any law which might adversely
affect this right is likely to be viewed with disfavor. When a party

must resort to the petition process in order to obtain a place on the
ballot for its candidates and the requirements of the process are so
stringent as to be unduly burdensome, then the voters who wish to

cast their ballots for the candidates of the minority party are suffering
invidious discrimination. 3 3 This situation violates the second

fundamental principle inherent in the right to vote-that "the
Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters. ...

."

The application of an equal protection analysis to the petition
process in Williams v. Rhodes35 was a logical extension of the
Supreme Court's emphasis on voting rights. Williams arose as a
result of efforts by the American Independent Party to obtain a place
on the 1968 Presidential ballot in Ohio. The Ohio statutes required

that any party which failed to receive 10 percent of the vote in the last
gubernatorial election submit petitions containing the names of

qualified voters amounting to at least 15 percent of the total vote in
that election to obtain a place on a subsequent ballot.3 6 Complex
30. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). Relying extensively on Baker v. Carr, the Court ruled that
congressional districts must be apportioned in such a way that a vote in one district in a
congressional election will have the same weight as a vote in another district.
31. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Elaborating on Baker v. Carr, the Court held that both houses of a
bicameral legislature must be apportioned substantially on the basis of population in order to
avoid a violation of the equal protection clause. Some commentators contend that Reynolds was
the single most important case in the equal protection series; one has even maintained that the
case "opened a new era of constitutional political theory.
... Barton, The General-Election
Ballot: More Nominees or More Representative Nominees?, 22 STAN. L. REV. 165, 178-79

(1970).
32.
33.
34.
35.

Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I, 17 (1964).
See 314 F. Supp. at 989 and cases cited therein.
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963).
393 U.S. 23 (1968).
36. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3517-01 (1960). For a discussion of the subsequent history of
this provision, see note 75 infra and accompanying text.
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organizational requirements also had to be satisfied.3 7 The United
States Supreme Court concluded that "the totality of the Ohio
restrictive laws taken as a whole imposes a burden on voting and
associational rights which . . . is an invidious discrimination, in
'3
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Amalgamating the principles established in the equal protection
cases,3 9 the Williams v. Rhodes opinion emphasized "the right of

qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their
votes effectively." 40 The Court reasoned that the Ohio statutes, by
establishing such stringent requirements for placing third-party
candidates on the ballot, put substantially heavier burdens on persons
wishing to promote and elect such candidates than on persons who
favored one of the two major parties. In effect, a preferred class of
voters was created. Having failed to show a compelling justification

for this, 41 Ohio was ordered to place the names of the presidential
electors of the American Independent Party on the ballot.

A major freedom of association issue was also present in Williams
v. Rhodes, although the Court did not posit its holding on that
ground4 2 However, the majority opinion does seem to have been

prepared with an acute awareness that political parties may be the
ultimate example of the associational freedom.

3

Indeed, the Court

37. Id. §§ 3517.02-.04 (establishment of party committees); 3505.10 (requirement of a
national convention); 3513.11 (state convention requirement); 3513.191 (party loyalty
requirement). Ohio was recently enjoined from the enforcement of the first three provisions in
this list, on the ground that they represented an unreasonable burden on minority parties,
Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 318 F. Supp. 1262 (S.D. Ohio 1970), appealfiled sub nont,
Rhodes v. Sweetenham, 39 U.S.L.W. 3350 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1971) (No. 1104). The opinion stated
that Williams v. Rhodes had already expressly declared the provisions to be unconsitutional. Id.
at 1266. This statement was in error; indeed, no specific statutory requirement was rejected in
Williams. The language used by the Supreme Court in that case relied heavily on generalities.
See note 38 infra and accompanying text. For further discussion of SLP v. Rhodes, see notes 75
& 83 infra.
38. 393 U.S. at 34.
39. See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text.
40. 393 U.S. at 30.
41. The interests asserted by Ohio were: the promotion of a two-party system to encourage
compromise and political stability; the avoidance of a situation in which the runner-up in a
multi-candidate election might have been preferred over the plurality winner by a majority of the
voters; and the prevention of confusion that might result by having a large number of parties
listed on the ballot. Ohio also contended that any disaffected group would actually have a
chance to present its views more effectively within the framework provided by the major parties.
For a discussion of these arguments, see id. at 31-34.
42. For an excellent discussion of the background of the freedom of association issue, see 20
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 892, n. 12 (1969).
43. For a brief but thorough discussion by a political scientist of the function of political

parties in the United States, see A. SINDLER,

POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES

(1966).
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reaffirmed its conviction that the freedom to associate in
organizations, whether political or otherwise, is an implied first
amendment right." As such, it is incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment and entitled to "protection from infringement by the
States." 4 5
In his discussion of freedom of association in the majority
opinion, Justice Black clearly had in mind the sort of rigid compelling
state interest test that is often equated only with equal protection
problems. In an earlier case dealing with freedom of association,
Black had written that
laws which actually affect the exercise of... [such] ... vital rights cannot be
sustained merely because they were enacted for the purpose of dealing with
some evil within the State's legislative competence, or even because the laws do
in fact provide a helpful means of dealing with such an evil."

In Williams he expanded this idea with the statement that Ohio had
"failed to show any 'compelling interest' which justifies imposing
. . . heavy burdens on the right to vote and to associate.' 47 The
conclusion seems inescapable that the freedom of association issue in
Williams is unalterably bound to the principal holding centering on
equal protection."
S WP v. Rockefeller 4 and GS WP v. Fortson4' combine to provide
a detailed analysis of the major problems involved in the use of the
petition process to gain access to the ballot. Although the Williams
decision established the basic law on the subject, Rockefeller and
Fortson provide a review of specific issues that is considerably more
complete .5 These issues include:
What qualifications must be met by a voter in order to be a valid signer of a

petition?
44. For earlier discussions of the point, see United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389
U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449

(1958).
45. 393 U.S. at 30-31. Freedom of association has repeatedly been included within the
purview of the fourteenth amendment, sometimes of its own force but more often as a necessary
adjunct of free speech. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276-77 (1964), and
cases cited therein.
46. United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
47. 393 U.S. at 31 (emphasis added).
48. For the sake of convenience, it may be permissible to refer to freedom of association as
an "ancillary issue" in Williams. See Barton, supra note 31, at 175. However, such language
should not be allowed to obscure the true importance of the issue.
49. 314 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
50. 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
5I. Although Rockefeller and Fortson deal with the issues as they relate to elections for state
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What sanctions, if any, are permissible when a voter signs more than one
nominating petition for a particular office?
What degree of thoroughness is required-or acceptable-in the investigation
of the residency of signers?
May a minority party candidate be forced to pay a qualifying fee as well as
comply with petition requirements?
What degree of geographic distribution of the petition signers may a state
require?
How many signatures may be required for a valid petition?

The first concern in the preparation of any nominating petition is
to assure that the persons who sign are qualified voters under state
law. This step is deceptively difficult. In New York, for example, state
law had long required that the only voters who could sign nominating
petitions were those who had been registered to vote in the last general
election held in the state. 2 Prior to the decision in S WP v. Rockefeller
this provision was upheld on a number of occasions. 3 The Rockefeller
court ignored these precedents, however, and held the New York
statute unconstitutional on the ground that it created
arbitrary classifications with respect to new voters who may sign major party
primary designating petitions, [denied] otherwise qualified voters the
opportunity to support candidates of their choice and [barred] minority parties
from seeking the support of these new voters without compelling justification
therefor.m

A state is also apparently limited in the sanctions it may impose
when a voter signs more than one nominating petition for a particular
office. The plaintiffs in S WP v. Rockefeller attacked as defectively
overbroad that provisions' of the New York Election Law "which
discounts the signature of a voter on a nominating petition if that
voter's name appears upon another petition designating or
nominating the same or different person for the same office." 6 The
SWP feared that this provision permitted the state to strike the name
of such a voter from all petitions for the particular office involved,
offices, the holdings are relevant to presidential elections as well, since state statutes also control
access to the ballot in those elections.
52. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 138(6) (McKinney 1964).
53. See Emanuel v. Power, 25 N.Y.2d 962,252 N.E.2d 854, 305 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1969); Davis
v. Board of Elections, 5 N.Y.2d 66, 153 N.E.2d 879, 179 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1958). The Davis
decision cited administrative necessity as a satisfactory basis for the prior registration
requirement. In Emanuel the court simply upheld the requirement without comment.
54. 314 F. Supp. at 992-93.
55. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 138(6) (McKinney 1964).
56. 314 F. Supp. at 993.
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thus preventing the voter's signature from being accepted even on the
first petition he signed.
In answer to this argument the Rockefeller court indicated that
requiring the assurance of each independent party which puts forward
a candidate for a specific office that it is supported by qualified voters
who do not dilute their support by assisting other candidates is a
permissible state interest. For this reason, the court maintained that
New York's statutory requirement was calculated to promote, rather
than hinder, voter independence. 57 However, the Rockefeller decision
carefully noted that the state judiciary had long required only that the
name of "a person signing a petition 'shall not be counted' on a
second valid and effective petition nominating the same or a different
candidate for the same office." 58 In other words, the voter may be
certain that his signature will at least be counted on the first valid
petition he signs. The court then set forth a clear warning:
As so construed, this provision would be constitutionally permissible. Of
course, should this approach not be adopted by the State, then the provision in
question would be "defectively overbroad." For it would be impermissible on
less than a showing of a compelling state interest to deny a voter the right to
support a candidate of his choice and to deny such support to that
candidate. ....
.
1

The court also approved the New York statutory provision
requiring authenticating witnesses to ascertain the residency and voter
qualifications of signers.6 0 However, if such a requirement were
literally applied, it could present a harrowing bottleneck to the rapid
and orderly preparation of nominating petitions. An in-depth
examination of the background of signers would pose severe
administrative difficulties for parties using the petition process and
might cause the voters themselves unnecessary inconvenience. The
holding in S WP v. Rockefeller states, therefore, that the knowledge
requirement may be satisfied by a simple oral inquiry and nothing
more." This procedure, of course, tends to emasculate the basic
requirement. Nevertheless, it represents a necessary compromise
between the American tradition of personalized politics and the
realities of an increasingly urbanized life style. In an era when it is
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 993-94.
60. N.Y. EracriON

LAW

61. 314 F. Supp. at 994.

§ 138(3) (McKinney 1964).
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impossible for most candidates to meet even a small fraction of their
potential constituents and campaigning is increasingly dependent on
the mass media, it would be illogical to expect subscribing witnesses
to actually have personal knowledge of the background of the petition
signers. Such a requirement belongs to another century. 62
The burdens that often accompany the petition process, which the
Rockefeller court sought so diligently to lighten, are accentuated
when a minority party candidate is required to pay a qualifying fee to
have his name listed on the ballot. At the same time, the fee presents
no particular hardship to the major political parties and may even
provide an indirect benefit for them.6 3 Therefore, although not directly
a part of the petition process, the qualifying fee is an integral factor in
the overall problem of access to the ballot.
At least three purposes have been set forth as grounds for the fee
requirement," all of which result from an unfavorable reaction to
multi-candidate elections. From a purely practical standpoint, it is
feared that complex voting machinery would break down under the
strain of a mass influx of candidates. Secondly, the states arguably
have a legitimate interest in making certain that only those candidates
who are serious and acting in good faith should obtain places on the
ballot.65 Finally, proponents of the qualifying fee argue that the
collected funds serve valuable purposes. For example, they may be
used by the state government for the financing of elections or
channeled to the executive committees of the qualified parties to
strengthen the existing party system. The latter use has received
special praise,66 even though it is glaringly inequitable to minority
parties struggling to challenge the two-party tradition.
62. The New York Court of Appeals had apparently already approved the limited
authentication procedure outlined in Rockefeller. See Schaller v. McNab, 16 N.Y.2d 976, 212
N.E.2d 776, 265 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965). The Schaller holding was directly concerned with section
135 of the Election Law, which requires that the witnesses of a petition must sign a statement
containing the words "I know each of the voters whose names are subscribed to this
petition ..
" N.Y. ELECTiON LAW § 135(3) (McKinney 1964). However, the Rockefeller
court found it to be equally applicable to section 138(3).
63. See text accompanying note 66 infra.
64. See Wetherington v. Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
65. This argument is a simple one:
In order to insure serious political candidates, it is justifiable to require a reasonable
filing fee. A serious candidate for public office has traditionally attracted money for his
candidacy. The inability to pay a reasonable filing fee might indicate lack of potential
support for a person's candidacy. Id. at 321.
66. Id.
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Under current judicial developments, the candidate may be
relieved of the twin burdens of the petition process and the fee
payment. In GSWP v. Fortson the court weighed the issues and
concluded:
[T]o require of an indigent independent candidate in a general election that he
come forward with both a nominating petition and a qualifying fee, with no
other means of getting on the ballot, is a violation of equal protection."

Whether the same logic will be applied to candidates of all
independent and newly-developing parties, regardless of indigency,
remains to be determined. However, it is inappropriate and
shortsighted to "say as a matter of law that one's candidacy is not
serious or that he does not have the right to run merely because he
does not have or has thus far failed to attract a certain amount of
money." 68
The last two issues involved in the petition process-the necessary
geographic distribution of the petition signers and the required
number of signatures -clearly illustrate the essentially opposing
positions taken by SWP v. Rockefeller and GSWP v. -Fortson
regarding the scope of the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v.
Rhodes. Therefore, these two issues should be considered jointly. It
has previously been noted that S WP v. Rockefeller invalidated New
York's requirement of fifty signatures per county.6" Citing Moore v.
Ogilvie, 71 the three-judge court in New York found the existing
formula to be rigid, arbitrary, and totally inequitable. Unlike the
Rockefeller case, GSWP v. Fortson gave extensive consideration to
the number of signatures that may be required for a valid petition.
This figure may be determined through the use of a percentage figure
or an absolute number, and Georgia presently requires signatures
amounting to five percent of the total number of voters eligible in the
last election to cast ballots for the particular office for which a
petition is being prepared. 71 Fortson upheld this provision, which
admittedly appears much fairer than Ohio's requirement, viewed with
disfavor in Williams v. Rhodes,72 of 15 percent of the total vote in the
67. 315 F. Supp. at 1041. See also Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ga. 1969),
appeal dismissed sub noma. Mattews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970).
68. 315 F. Supp. at 1041.
69. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
70. 394 U.S. 814 (1969). Illinois distribution requirements were held to discriminate against
residents of populous counties.
71. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1010(b) (1970).
72. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
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last election. However, the Fortson decision arguably failed to match
the spirit if not the letter of Williams.7'
The Fortson case clearly interprets the Williams holding as being
strictly limited to its specific facts. On the other hand, the Rockefeller
decision was evidently based on the view that Williams represents a
mandate for the judiciary to insure that all restrictions on the petition
process and access to the ballot must be reasonable and justifiable. In
its resolution of the issues, including the distribution problem, the
Rockefeller court favored the minority party on almost every
important point.
As suggested in Fortson,74 the Supreme Court invited this
confusion when it failed to strike down the Ohio petition requirements
in Williams.75 Indeed, since the American Independent Party had
apparently been successful in gathering more than the necessary
433, 100 signatures before the case even reached the Supreme Court,76
there is admittedly some basis for the contention that the Williams
decision was the product of the party's substantial compliance with
the Ohio statutes, rather than the inherent unreasonableness of the
statutes themselves.
Having already affirmed the Rockefeller decision,77 the Court will
soon be reviewing GSWP v. Fortson." Hopefully, the interpretive
argument regarding Williams can then be settled with some degree of
finality. The broad approach taken in S WP v. Rockefeller is likely to
prevail in Fortson and in any similar cases which may arise, for the
Williams decision is simply not one that easily lends itself to a narrow
construction. Even some of the justices who dissented in Williams felt
that the decision would play a broad rather than a narrow role in
future developments relating to access to the ballot, thus extending its
impact far beyond the particular facts of the case: "The rationale of
the opinion of the Court, based both on the Equal Protection Clause
73. See note 85 infra and accompanying text.
74. 315 F. Supp. at 1039.
75. However, the unfavorable attitude of the Supreme Court in Williams caused the Ohio
legislature to lower the fifteen percent requirement to seven percent. Onto REV. CoDE
ANN. § 3517.01 (Supp. 1970). This provision has been declared unconstitutional by a three-

judge district court on the ground that it was too burdensome on the "right to political
association and the right of qualified voters to cast their ballots effectively." Socialist Labor
Party v. Rhodes, 318 F. Supp. 1262, 1268 (S.D. Ohio 1970). Also see notes 36 supra and 83
infra.

76. 393 U.S. at 45 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
77. 400 U.S. 806 (1970).
78. 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
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and the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of association, will

apply to all elections, national, state, and local." 7
Certainly the affirmance of SWP v. Rockefeller indicates that
rigid distribution formulas are now unacceptable. Of course, an
argument can be made that a modicum of statewide electoral support
is not altogether an anachronism even in this age of increasing
urbanization,"0 when economic power and population growth are
becoming heavily centralized in metropolitan areas. Indeed, a

majority of the Supreme Court has indicated in at least one decision
that a balancing of urban and rural interests is not necessarily bad.8 1
However, a failure to make some adjustment for increasing

urbanization will lead to the same sort of serious inequities in the
petition process that brought about the legislative reapportionment

decisions. If a state does not recognize the problem and take remedial83
action itself, 2 litigation represents the only real hope for a solution.

Otherwise, it is not difficult to imagine a candidate who enjoys
79. 393 U.S. at 63 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
80. See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 821 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
81. See Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 117 (1967). The case arose out of the consolidation of
the city of Virginia Beach, Virginia, and Princess Anne County. The consolidation plan
provided for a governmental council of I1 members, all of whom were to be elected at large.
Four could be chosen without regard to residence, while the seven others each had to reside in a
separate borough. The boroughs varied considerably in population. However, the Supreme
Court held that the overall plan reflected "a detente between urban and rural communities that
may be important in resolving the complex problems of the modern megalopolis in relation to
the city, the suburbia, and the rural countryside." Id. at 117.
82. At least one state that had an extremely inequitable petition procedure has seen fit to
make sweeping changes. Until recently Idaho permitted no more than 150 signatures from any
one county on a valid petition for statewide office. Act of April 10, 1967, ch. 360, § 34-612 C,
11967] Idaho Laws 1031 (repealed 1971). In application, this rather innocuous sounding
requirement meant that one Idaho county with a population of 675 could at least technically
exert as much influence on the petition process as the most populous county, which has a
population 162 times as great. 1971 WORLD ALMANAC 447. In a tacit acknowledgement of the
unreasonableness of this provision, a blanket repeal of this and related provisions has just gone
into effect. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-612A-D (Cum. Supp. 1970), repealing ch. 360, § 34612A-D, [1967] Idaho Laws 1016.
83. A prime example is Michigan, which required that:
The petitions shall be signed by at least 100 residents in each of at least 10 counties of the
state and not more than 35% of the minimum required number of the signatures may be
by resident electors of any one county. MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 168.685 (1967).
This requirement was held to be in clear violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Socialist Workers Party v. Hare, 304 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Mich. 1969). Moreover,
an Ohio Statute, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.258 (1970), requiring that gubernatorial
candidates representing independent parties present petitions containing the signatures of at least
200 qualified voters from each of 30 counties has been held to violate the principle of one man,
one vote. Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 318 F. Supp. 1262, 1272 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
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enormous metropolitan support facing critical obstacles because of
implacable rural opposition. The district court's holding in SWP v.
Rockefeller recognized this predicament. Even former Chief Justice
Warren's insistence on "a substantial showing of voter interest in the
candidate""s does not necessitate a substantial showing in every
county. Although the analogy may be an oversimplification, it
appears self-evident that broad distribution requirements in the
petition process are as unacceptable as malapportioned state
legislatures. Whether the complete invalidation of all distribution
requirements should be undertaken is uncertain; some sort of
"reapportionment" may suffice in many instances.
If the Rockefeller approach to Williams is adopted, the
constitutionality of the Georgia percentage requirement upheld in
Fortson also becomes doubtful. In a portion of the Williams opinion,
Justice Black suggested that a formula setting the necessary number
of signatures at one percent of the total electorate be employed., This
one percent suggestion is presently the only hint that the Court has
offered concerning a satisfactory figure; by that standard the
principal holding in GS WP v. Fortson is open to reversal.
The states which utilize an absolute figure for the number of
signers, rather than a percentage, seem to have more reasonable
requirements, although no empirical evaluation of this has been made.
It may simply be that the percentages were chosen without careful
thought regarding the actual number of voters such percentages might
represent. At any rate, the highest absolute number is only 25,000.80
Moreover, in no instance does any numerical requirement exceed five
percent of the registered voters." Among those states employing the
percentage method, on the other hand, are found such severe
requirements as the one in North Carolina, where nominating
petitions must be "signed by qualified voters of the political division
in which the office will be voted for equal in number to twenty-five
percent (25%) of those who, in the last gubernatorial election in the
same political division, voted for Governor."Is The continued survival
84. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 63 (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).

85. 393 U.S. at 33 (dictum). Justice Black noted that a large number of states require
signatures amounting to only one percent of the electorate, and that such states have not
encountered any significant problems. Id., n.9.
86. 46 ILL. REv. STAT. § 10-3 (Supp. 1971).

87. 20 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 902 n.3 i.
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-122(1) (Cum. Supp. 1969).

Vol. 1971:451]

BALLOT ACCESS

of this requirement is very doubtful. It is substantially more
burdensome than even the Georgia percentage approved in GS WP v.
Fortson9 and clearly does not satisfy the formula proposed by Justice
Black9" in Williams v. Rhodes. Indeed, the percentage provision alone
appears sufficient to make the totality of North Carolina's petition
process a serious handicap to freedom of association and to the right
of all voters to equal protection under the law.
Based on the preceding analysis, the basic framework of the
petition process will eventually be characterized by the nonexistence
or liberalization of distribution provisions and by low numerical
requirements. Some observers believe that this situation will
encourage the growth of minority parties, which they contend would be
an abhorrent development. 9 Should this fear be warranted and if the
two-party system is worth preserving for the overall welfare of the
nation, then the judiciary must prepare itself for an unpleasant and
perhaps unresolvable choice between the preservation of a valued
political concept on the one hand and important constitutional
protections on the other. 92 It is more logical to conclude, however,
that no matter what happens, the two-party system will continue
unabated. The previous failure of even the strongest third-party
movements gives no reason to believe otherwise.9"
89. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
90. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
91. See Bickel, Is Electoral Reform the Answer?, COMMENTARY, Dec. 1968, at 41, 44, 51.
92. The Supreme Court has been reluctant to consider the petition problem at all when such
consideration would tend to conflict with time-honored limits on the authority of the courts to
grant relief. For example, mootness has been held to prevent the granting of a writ of a

mandamus in a petition matter, even though the Court knew that a similar case was likely to
arise again. See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41 (1969).
93. For a concise and readable discussion of the history of party politics in the United
States, with some relatively surprising predictions for the future, see Reichley, That Elusive
Political Majority, FORTUNE, March 1971, at 69.

